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 Counsel for Appellee 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.  
 A Task Force searching for an escaped fugitive entered 
the common areas of a multi-unit apartment building.  The 
building had a locked exterior door, and an inspector entered 
through a partially opened side window.  Once inside, the 
Task Force apprehended Defendant-Appellant Frank Correa 
in a common-use stairwell, and, after a struggle, Correa 
informed the inspector he had a firearm.  The inspector 
retrieved the firearm from Correa‟s pocket.  Correa moved to 
suppress the firearm and the statement he made to the 
inspector as fruit of an illegal seizure.  The District Court 
denied the motion.  We previously held in United States v. 
Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992), that a resident of 
an unlocked multi-unit apartment building lacks an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
building‟s common areas.  We determine today that the 
presence of a locked exterior door does not alter that 
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expectation.  Accordingly, Correa‟s suppression motion was 
properly denied.  We will affirm.     
 
I. 
 In December 2007, the Essex County Fugitive Task 
Force
1
 (“Task Force”) was searching for Jose Espinosa, an 
escaped inmate from Union County Jail.  The Task Force 
learned that two of Espinosa‟s known associates, Luis Luna 
and James Romero, were at 41 Elm Street in Elizabeth, New 
Jersey.  Both Luna and Romero had outstanding arrest 
warrants, plus criminal histories including drug dealing and 
firearm possession. 
 
 In the early morning hours of December 19, 2007, the 
Task Force prepared to execute the arrest warrants on Luna 
and Romero.  The Task Force was equipped with firearms, 
handcuffs, and bulletproof vests.  The Task Force arrived at 
41 Elm Street, a multi-unit apartment building.  The front 
entrance to the building was locked.  A sign posted outside 
the front entrance read, in English and Spanish, “[N]o visitors 
are permitted in this building unless []accompanied by a 
resident, anyone not accompanied . . . by a resident will be 
prosecuted as a trespasser.”  Appx. 71a. 
  
                                              
1
 The Essex County Fugitive Task Force 
included members of the Essex County Sheriff‟s 
Office and the Union County Sheriff‟s Office, as well 
as FBI agents and United States Marshals Service 
deputies.  
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 Although the building‟s front entrance was locked, 
Inspector Marshal Daniel R. Potucek was able to climb 
through a partially open window into a common stairwell area 
inside the building.  Once inside, Inspector Potucek opened 
the building‟s front entrance and let in the rest of the Task 
Force.  The Task Force members positioned themselves in the 
first-floor hallway. 
 
 Shortly after entering the building, at approximately 
2:00 a.m., the Task Force members heard male voices coming 
up a common stairwell from the basement.  The Task Force 
members surrounded the entrance to the stairwell and 
encountered three men: Luna, Romero, and Defendant-
Appellant Frank Correa.  The Task Force members identified 
themselves to the three men and ordered them to get on the 
ground.  Luna and Romero were immediately recognized 
from photographs and secured.  After a short struggle, 
Inspector Potucek secured Correa, and Correa informed 
Inspector Potucek that he had a gun.  Inspector Potucek 
retrieved a loaded firearm from Correa‟s front pocket.  
 
 On March 27, 2008, a Grand Jury indicted Correa, 
charging him with unlawful possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Correa 
pled not guilty and moved to suppress the firearm as fruit of 
an illegal seizure.  The District Court held a hearing on 
Correa‟s suppression motion on October 15, 2008 and denied 
the motion on April 9, 2009.  United States v. Correa, 635 F. 
Supp. 2d 379 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 
 On November 30, 2009, the District Court granted 
Correa‟s motion to dismiss the indictment due to violations of 
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the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162.
2
  The next day, 
December 1, 2009, Correa was indicted on the same charges.  
At arraignment on December 10, 2009, Correa‟s counsel 
confirmed the District Court‟s previous denial of Correa‟s 
suppression motion and agreed to incorporate the prior record 
into the new indictment. 
 
 On January 20, 2010, after a bench trial, the District 
Court convicted Correa on the felon-in-possession-of-a-
firearm charge.  On April 21, 2010, the District Court 
sentenced Correa to 100 months‟ imprisonment followed by 
three years‟ supervised release.  Correa timely appealed on 
April 22, 2010. 
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “We review the district court‟s denial of [a] motion 
to suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but 
exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the court‟s 
properly found facts.”  United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 
159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).  The 
proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of 
establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978); United States 
v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
III. 
                                              
2
 The indictment was dismissed without 
prejudice.  Correa does not dispute the District Court‟s 
dismissal without prejudice.  Correa Br. 1 n.1. 
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A defendant must have standing to invoke the Fourth 
Amendment‟s exclusionary rule.  Stearn, 597 F.3d at 551; see 
also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (“[C]apacity 
to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . 
upon whether the person who claims the protection of the 
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place.” (quotation marks omitted)).  “Fourth 
Amendment standing requires that the individual challenging 
the search have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
property searched . . . and that he manifest a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the property searched[.]”  Kennedy, 
638 F.3d at 163 (quotation marks omitted); see Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
Regarding the objective prong, “we inquire whether the 
individual‟s expectation of privacy is „one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.‟”  Bond v. United States, 
529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).  Regarding the subjective prong, “we 
ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an 
actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown 
that „he [sought] to preserve [something] as private.‟”  Id.  
With these concepts in mind, we now turn to the case before 
us.  
 
Correa argues that the Task Force violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by unlawfully entering the common areas 
of a locked, multi-unit apartment building and seizing him.  
Thus, according to Correa, his firearm and statements must be 
suppressed as fruit of an unlawful seizure.  We disagree. 
 
 Correa did not have Fourth Amendment standing to 
challenge this search because he lacked an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a 
 7 
 
multi-unit apartment building with a locked exterior door.
3
  In 
Acosta, we held that a resident of a multi-unit apartment 
complex lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of the multi-unit apartment 
complex, at least where the exterior door is unlocked.  965 
F.2d at 1253.  We now extend Acosta and join a number of 
other Circuit Courts of Appeals in holding that a resident 
lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
common areas of a multi-unit apartment building with a 
locked exterior door.  United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 
1242 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 
1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 
872 F.2d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1989), abrogated on other 
grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990); 
United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977); see 
also United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in common 
areas of high-rise apartment building where front door had an 
“undependable lock that was inoperable on the day in 
question”).4     
                                              
3
 As noted, to have Fourth Amendment 
standing, the proponent of a motion to suppress must 
prove he had both an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy and an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy.  Because we determine that 
Correa lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy, we need not consider whether he proved a 
subjective expectation of privacy.    
 
4
 The First Circuit has not yet addressed locked 
apartment buildings, but has held that “„a tenant lacks 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common 
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Moreover, we think Correa lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the building‟s common areas 
because he did not have control over these areas.  After all, 
“[a]n expectation of privacy necessarily implies an 
expectation that one will be free of any intrusion, not merely 
unwarranted intrusions.”  Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816.  Here, any 
resident in the multi-unit apartment building could admit 
guests, delivery people, repair workers, postal carriers, 
custodians, and others into the common areas of the 
apartment building.  See Miravalles, 280 F.3d at 1332; 
Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1242.  Additionally, the purpose of the 
locked front door was to “provide security to the occupants, 
not privacy in common hallways.”  Id.  Finally, residents 
benefit from police protection in these common areas.  United 
States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985).  Given 
the plethora of individuals who could access the common 
areas of the locked multi-unit apartment building and 
Correa‟s inability to control these areas, Correa “could not 
                                                                                                     
areas of an apartment building.‟”  United States v. 
Rheault, 561 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting 
United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 
1998)). 
To our knowledge, the only Court of Appeals 
case holding that a resident has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the common areas of a 
locked apartment building is United States v. Carriger, 
541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976), but the Sixth Circuit has 
limited this outlier case.  See United States v. Dillard, 
438 F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that 
other circuits have “explicitly reject[ed]” Carriger and 
declining “to step further outside the mainstream” by 
extending Carriger).   
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have reasonably expected [his] privacy to extend beyond [his] 
apartment door.”  Acosta, 965 F.2d at 1252.  
   
Finally, we reiterate that Fourth Amendment standing 
turns on legitimate expectations of privacy and not – as 
Correa argues – on concepts of property-law trespass.  See 
United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 
1976) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in an 
apartment complex‟s common areas and noting that 
“[w]hether or not the agents‟ entry was a technical trespass is 
not the relevant inquiry”).  Indeed, many places designated as 
“private” by the common law of property do not garner 
Fourth Amendment protection because they have been 
knowingly exposed to public view and lose a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 212-14 (1986) (curtilage observable from public airspace 
not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection); United States 
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (dwelling‟s threshold is 
“public”).  Here, the common areas of the apartment building 
are similarly “public” spaces and not entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Correa‟s argument that the Task 
Force violated his Fourth Amendment rights by trespassing in 
the common areas of the locked, multi-unit apartment 
building misses the mark.  The relevant question is whether 
Correa had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the common areas.  For the reasons discussed, he did not.  
Therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, and we 
will affirm. 
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We have considered Correa‟s other arguments and find 
them unavailing.
5
 
 
IV. 
 We conclude that a resident lacks an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a 
locked, multi-unit apartment building.  Therefore, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s denial of Correa‟s suppression 
motion.  We also affirm Correa‟s conviction and sentence.  
                                              
5
 Correa contends that the Task Force violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights under Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).  However, neither Payton 
nor Steagald applies to this case.  As we said in United 
States v. Veal, “Payton requires that officers have a 
reasonable belief the arrestee (1) lived in the residence, 
and (2) is within the residence at the time of entry.”  
453 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks 
omitted).  But here, the Task Force entered the 
common areas of a locked, multi-unit apartment 
building, not a residence.  Similarly, Steagald holds 
that, absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement 
officers with an arrest warrant may not enter a third 
party‟s home to search for the subject of the arrest 
warrant.  451 U.S. at 213-14.  But the Task Force 
entered the common areas of an apartment building, 
not a home. 
